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ABSTRACT
Finding the root-cause of a network security anomaly is es-
sential for network operators. In our recent work [1, 5], we
introduced a generic technique that uses frequent itemset
mining to automatically extract and summarize the trac
ows causing an anomaly. Our evaluation using two dierent
anomaly detectors (including a commercial one) showed that
our approach works surprisingly well extracting the anoma-
lous ows in most studied cases using sampled and unsam-
pled NetFlow traces from two networks. In this demonstra-
tion, we will showcase an open-source anomaly-extraction
system based on our technique, which we integrated with
a commercial anomaly detector and use in the NOC of the
GEANT network since late 2009. We will report a num-
ber of detected security anomalies and will illustrate how an
operator can use our system to automatically extract and
summarize anomalous ows.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.6 [Computer
- Communication Networks]: Internetworking
General Terms: Design, Experimentation, Measurement,
Security, Verication.
Keywords: Anomaly extraction, anomaly validation, asso-
ciation rules.
1. INTRODUCTION
In our recent work [1, 2], we studied the problem of pre-
cisely identifying all the trac ows associated with an
anomaly among a large set of candidate ows, during a time
interval where a detector has triggered an alarm and has
given some initial, but possibly incomplete, meta-data about
the anomaly. We call nding these ows the anomalous ow
extraction problem or simply anomaly extraction. At the
high-level, anomaly extraction reects the goal of gaining
more information about an anomaly alarm: without com-
plete and compactly presented meta-data, root-cause anal-
ysis, mitigation, and prevention of future similar anomalies
are very hard tasks for network and security engineers.
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The steps we follow for anomaly extractions are as follows:
1) a detector raises an alarm for a time interval and identi-
es related meta-data, such as aected IP addresses or port
numbers: this provides a set of candidate anomalous ows;
2) we model a ow as an itemset and use frequent itemset
mining to extract from the large set of candidate ows the
top-k itemsets with the highest support. Our assumption
and intuition for applying frequent itemset mining is that
anomalies often result in many ows with similar character-
istics, e.g., common IP addresses or ports, since they have a
common root-cause, like a network failure or a scripted DoS.
We implemented our anomaly extraction technique using
the Apriori frequent itemset algorithm and applied it on a
histogram-based anomaly detector [3] using the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) distance to detect anomalies. Our results us-
ing labeled unsampled NetFlow traces from the medium-size
backbone network of SWITCH showed that our approach
eectively extracted the anomalous ows in all 31 analyzed
cases and it triggered very few false-positive itemsets, which
can be trivially ltered out by an administrator.
In our follow-up work [5], we further evaluated and
improved Apriori on the GEANT Europe-wide backbone
network, this time using 1/100 sampled NetFlow traces
and a commercial anomaly detection system (NetReex by
Guavus) that since fall 2009 is deployed in the network. Ne-
tReex is based on a well-known anomaly detector [4] us-
ing Principal Component Analysis. This second evaluation
leveraged DANTE's experience in manual anomaly investi-
gation (more than one thousand of anomalies were checked
previously to this work, during a benchmarking of anomaly
detection tools [6]). We observed that if an anomaly is not
characterized by a signicant volume of ows, Apriori can-
not extract it. For instance, this occurs in the case of point
to point UDP oods (involving a small number of ows but
a large number of packets), which happen frequently in the
GEANT network. For this reason, we extended Apriori to
also compute the support of an itemset in terms of pack-
ets in addition to ows. We added to Apriori as well the
capability of automatically self-adjusting some of its cong-
uration parameters to properly select meaningful itemsets
depending on the anomaly being analyzed.
To ease the use of the extended Apriori, we implemented
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Figure 1: Anomaly extraction system architecture.
an anomaly extraction system whose architecture is depicted
in Figure 1. The operator, through a GUI, can compute
the frequent itemsets associated with an alarm, investigate
the ows of any returned itemset, and tune the extraction
parameters if needed. The GUI integrates with a back-end
that stores ow records and that is based on the popular
open-source tool NfDump. In addition, our system reads
from a database information about an alarm (e.g., the time
interval and the aected trac features) and thus can be
integrated with any anomaly detection system that provides
these data. Our implementation is open-source and will be
made publicly available.
The extended Apriori and its GUI were tested on the
GEANT backbone network, where since fall 2009 NetReex
regularly detects security related anomalies and provides the
initial meta-data that Apriori uses as input. We used the
GUI to analyze 40 alarms agged by NetReex on Sampled
NetFlow data from GEANT. The anomaly extraction pro-
cess eectively identied useful itemsets associated with a
security incident in 94% of the cases. For the remaining 6%
of the alarms we were not able to extract meaningful ows,
which could be due to a stealthy anomaly not captured by
our extraction technique or due to a false positive-alarm.
In addition, for 28% of the cases with useful itemsets, the
algorithm evidenced additional ows not provided by the
anomaly detector. We believe that this capability of nding
more ows related to an anomaly has general applicability.
2. DEMONSTRATION OUTLINE
Our demonstration will have two parts. First, we will use
NetReex to show detected anomalies on the basis of vol-
ume and IP features entropy variations [4]. It is thus suited
to detect both anomalies resulting in large amounts of pack-
ets, bytes or ows (such as DoS and DDoS, both TCP and
UDP based) as well as low volume anomalies but resulting in
big shifts in the concentration or distribution of the number
of contacted hosts and/or contacted port numbers, which
happens in network and port scans. It provides ne-grained
meta-data often at the level of individual IPs and port num-
bers for which the entropy variation algorithm detected a
minimum concentration. Such ne-grained meta-data, as
we describe in [2], can miss part of an anomaly or may in-
clude a large number of false-positive ows in the cases of
popular port numbers or IP addresses.
The second part of the demo will use our anomaly ex-
traction system to further analyze the anomalies detected
by NetReex and to extract the responsible ows. The GUI
starts from the meta-data provided by the anomaly detec-
Table 1: List of itemsets found by our system for a
particular port scan detected by NetReex.
srcIP dstIP srcPort dstPort #ows
X.191.64.165 Y.13.137.129 55548 * 312.59K
X.191.64.165 Y.13.137.129 55548 * 270.74K
* Y.13.137.129 3072 80 37.19K
* Y.13.137.129 1024 80 37.28K
tion tool to select ows with a large support in terms of
ows or packets and tries all possible combinations of their
union [2]. In several cases (26% in our evaluation) our sys-
tem nds ows related to the anomaly that the anomaly de-
tector missed. These are particularly interesting cases. For
example, the following meta-data were signaled and labeled
as a port scan by NetReex:
srcIP dstIP srcPort dstPort
X.191.64.165 Y.13.137.129 55548 *
When analyzing the same anomaly using our system, the
itemsets in Table 1 were found. The 1st was precisely the
itemset responsible of the anomaly already agged by Ne-
tReex. The 2nd was another host doing a similar port
scan on the same target, while the 3rd and 4th were two
simultaneous DDoS on port 80 against the same target. By
inspecting the raw ows with our system we observed that
the DDoS was a TCP SYN ood and that it happened a few
minutes after the scan. During the demo we will show other
interesting anomalies like this one that will demonstrate the
usefulness of this kind of information for a security engineer.
The demo will be based on both live and historical data from
the 18 points-of-presence of the GEANT network.
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